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1. Introduction
During the last decade, an increasing number of central banks have become more transparent 
about their objectives, procedures, rationales, models and data. Central bank transparency as well 
as its independence is actually considered as the best practice in monetary policy and the most 
distinguishing characteristics of central banking today in comparing with earlier historical periods. 
Independence is generally justified as a way of permitting the appointment of central bankers who 
are more conservative than the median voter in order to offset  the inflationary bias leading to 
inability to pre-commit. Most economists have argued that greater transparency is beneficial since 
it improves democratic accountability by allowing the public to judge more accurately whether an 
independent  central  bank  is  committed  to  its  announced  policy  and  hence  improves  policy 
effectiveness  by  facilitating  the  interpretation  of  policy  changes.1 However,  the  behavior  of 
independent central banks is quite heterogeneous in information disclosure (Eijffinger and Geraats, 
2006). 
Empirical studies  have  lead  to  divergent  or  ambiguous  findings  concerning  the  effects  of 
transparency  on  the  average  level  and  variability  of  inflation  and  output  gap.  For  example, 
according to Chortareas  et al. (2001), disclosure of inflation forecasts reduces inflation volatility 
without necessarily being associated with greater output volatility. Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet 
(2007) have found that an increase of transparency benefits to inflation variability, but has a less 
clear  effect  on output  volatility  and no effects  on average  levels  of  inflation  and output.  The 
analysis of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) suggests broadly favorable if relatively weak impacts on 
inflation and output variability. But greater transparency of central bank policymaking – in which 
1 Posen  (2003)  considers  however  there  is  disjunction  between  central  bank  transparency  and  independence  or 
accountability.
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committee  deliberations  are  made more  open to  the  public  –  may prevent  the full  and  frank 
discussion needed to make the best decisions (Meade and Stasavage, 2008).
Most economists are instinctually of the view that more information is better and hence agree 
that openness and communication with the public are crucial  for the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, because they allow the private sector to improve expectations and hence to make better-
informed  decisions  (Blinder,  1998;  Blinder  et  al.,  2001).2 It  has  been  also  argued  that  more 
openness reduces uncertainty for players on financial markets and makes future decisions more 
transparent (Issing, 2001). 
Adding  distortions,  some  researchers  have  provided  counterexamples  where  information 
disclosure  reduces  instead  the  possibility  for  central  banks  to  strategically  use  their  private 
information and greater transparency may not lead to a welfare improvement. In effect, according 
to the theory of the second best, removing one distortion may not always lead to a more efficient 
allocation when other distortions are present. 
For example,  in a framework where the public attempts to infer the central bank’s type from 
information on policy outcomes, incomplete transparency can be optimal as a result of a trade-off 
between the effect on the central bank’s reputation and its consequent ability to control inflation on 
the one hand, and the private sector’s wish to see output, employment and prices stabilized on the 
other hand (Faust and Svensson, 2001; Jensen, 2002). Information asymmetries between the public 
and the central bank about the weight that the latter assigns to each target in its objective function 
may affect trade union behavior, induce wage moderation (Sorensen, 1991) and decrease both the 
level and the variance of inflation (Grüner, 2002). Starting from a position where both private and 
public information are imperfect, Morris and Shin (2002) show that greater precision of public 
information can lead individuals to attach inadequate weight to private information in the presence 
2 See Geraats (2002) for a survey of the literature and different concepts of transparency. 
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of coordination motives among private agents. For others, certain restrictions on transparency are 
important for operational reasons in order to reinforce the central bank credibility (Eijffinger and 
Hoeberichts, 2002).
Models focusing on monetary policy transparency typically consider two players, the monetary 
authority and the private sector. Departing from this approach, several authors introduce monetary 
and  fiscal  policy  interactions.3 Hughes  Hallett  and  Viegi  (2003)  examine  the  case  where  the 
government and private sector both face asymmetric information about central bank preferences. 
Considering a Nash game between the government and the central bank, they find that uncertainty 
about the ‘political’ preference parameter reduces average inflation, whereas uncertainty about the 
‘economic’ preference parameter has no effect  on average.  When distortionary fiscal  policy is 
endogenous  and the  government’s  political  preference  parameter  is  determined by  democratic 
elections,  their  results  suggest  that  lack  of  transparency is  likely  to  lead  to  a  more  left-wing 
government that cares less about inflation stabilization. 
Assuming that the government is a Stackelberg leader, Ciccarone et al. (2007) have shown, in a 
unionized economy with net supply-side fiscal policy, transparency has two contrasting effects on 
economic performance. Uncertainty on central bank preferences induces unions to reduce wages 
but also produces a fully-anticipated expansionary fiscal policy which favors the setting of higher 
wages. Furthermore, the “type” of the central bank (more or less conservative) determines the sign 
of the effect of opacity on the level of tax, inflation and output and their variability. Their findings 
imply that the central bank could in some cases achieve better results in terms of inflation with less 
than full transparency, but at the cost of less fiscal stability than it might wish. That helps explain 
the usual central bank rhetoric and frustration over the fiscal authorities apparent lack of fiscal 
discipline.
3 Some researchers study the relationship between central  bank transparency and the institutional  design (Walsh, 
2003; Hughes Hallett and Weymark, 2005; Hughes Hallett and Libich, 2006, 2009; Geraats, 2007).
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A common point  in  Hughes  Hallett  and  Viegi  (2003)  and Ciccarone  et  al.  (2007)  is  the 
existence of a fiscal bias. In the presence of distortionary taxes, active government introduces a 
fiscal bias through a  wage expectation effect.  As it  attempts to increase output through higher 
public expenditure ( g~ ), which is finally financed by higher distortionary taxes, the workers claim 
higher nominal wage since the marginal cost of unemployment for the central bank is lower. In 
effect, for unchanged inflation rate and inflation expectations (unchanged wage claims), the output 
gap will be lower and unemployment higher after an increase in tax rate.
In this paper, we reexamine the interaction between central bank transparency and fiscal bias in 
a two-period model where we distinguish public investment from distortionary tax by separating 
their effects on the output. That contrasts with Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) who consider only 
distortionary fiscal policy (or labor market regulations) as well as with Ciccarone et al. (2007) who 
include public investment and distortionary tax in an indicator of net supply fiscal policy. We also 
introduce budgetary constraint which is absent in these studies. To make our results also applicable 
to emerging market economies, we introduce an indicator of institutional quality as in Huang and 
Wei (2006). More precisely, weak institutions (e.g., corruption) are assumed to cause a leakage of 
the tax revenue: the lower is the institutional quality, the greater the leakage. 
We firstly consider a game with the timing as follows: First, the government sets the value of 
the fiscal instruments, i.e. distortionary taxes and public investment; then the private sector forms 
its inflation expectations and fixes the wage rate; and finally the central bank chooses the value of 
the monetary instrument to attain  the inflation target.  The government is  a Stackelberg leader 
taking into account how central bank is likely to react to its policy choice. In adopting the above 
sequential timing, we agree with the view that the Stackelberg equilibrium concept is the one that 
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better captures fiscal and monetary interactions (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1998; Beetsma and Uhlig, 
1999; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). 
The main conclusion we reach is that  if  the government takes optimal decisions  about tax 
policies and public investments, the central bank transparency has not any effect on the equilibrium 
levels of inflation and output in an economy where the only kind of uncertainty is that about the 
central bank preferences. The reason is that the fiscal bias due to distortionary taxes is completely 
eliminated by the effects of optimal public investments. These results are obtained independently of 
the institutional quality as the latter only affects the government’s budget.
To test the robustness of our results, we have considered two alternative games. The first is a 
variant of the previous Stackelberg game. The only change introduced is that the private sector 
forms its inflation expectations and fixes the wage rate before the government commits to its tax 
policies and public investments. The second is a Nash game where the government and the central 
bank are Nash players with the private sector moves first in forming its inflation expectations. We 
find that these alternative games do not modify the conclusions obtained in the initial game.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the two-period model. In the 
section after, we solve the policy game between the government and the central bank under a 
Stackelberg sequence of players’ moves. We analyze the effects of political transparency on the 
levels and variability of tax rates, public investments, inflation rates and outputs in two periods. In 
the fourth section, we offer some further insights in considering a slightly modified Stackelberg 
game, then a Nash game between the government and the central bank. We conclude in the last 
section.
2. The model
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The two-period model of discretionary policy making is based on Ismihan and Ozkan (2004). 
The demand side is neglected since the central bank can perfectly neutralize the effects of policy 
shock  or  exogenous  demand shocks  affecting  the  goods  market.  Considering  a  representative 
competitive firm which chooses labor to maximize profits by taking price (or inflation rate  tpi ), 
wage (hence expected inflation etpi ), and tax rate ( tτ ) on the total revenue of the firm in period t as 
given, subject to a production technology with productivity enhanced by public investment of last 
period ( itg 1− ), we have the following output supply ( tx ) function:
i
tt
e
ttt gx 1)( −+−−= ψγτpipiα , 0,, >ψγα  and 2,1=t . (1)
Equation (1) captures the case of supply-side fiscal policy in including the possibility for it to 
influence the aggregate  supply of  output.  In  effect,  there  is  a distinction to be made between 
supply-side  fiscal instruments, which could have permanent effects on the level of output, and 
demand side (fiscal) interventions which would not have any long-run impacts (except on the price 
level).4 
The presence of tτ   allows covering a whole range of structural reforms. In effect, the presence 
of  tτ  could  also  represent  non-wage  costs  associated  with  social  security  (or  job  protection 
legislation),  the pressures caused by tax or wage competition on a regional  basis  or the more 
general effects of supply-side deregulation (Demertzis et al., 2004). 
Taxes and supply-side restrictions are systematically non-neutral in their effects on output and 
hence distortionary in the sense of depressing output and employment more than surprise inflation 
can improve them. The inclusion of tτ  in equation (1) allows justifying hence the concern of the 
4 The case of demand side fiscal policy can be captured in replacing  tτ  by its deviation from its expected level (
e
tt ττ − ) in equation (1).
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central bank about fiscal restraint and structural reforms of the economy to be undertaken by the 
government,  even  though  its  decisions  would  only  be  indirectly  (via  output  gap)  affected  by 
whether those restraints/reforms were undertaken. 
However,  the negative effects of distortionary taxes on supply can be compensated by the 
positive ones of public investment. In the present model, the public investment in period 1−t  has a 
positive effect on the output of period  t , i.e. the public investment has a positive effect on the 
private sector productivity with one period lag. It can also represent a production subsidy to the 
firms that raises the supply of goods and services and reduces prices (Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). 
In order to focalize on the interaction between fiscal policies and monetary policy transparency, we 
do not introduce any shock affecting the supply side of the economy. 
The institutional framework corresponds to what is put in place in many industrial countries 
since 1990s: the government acting through the fiscal authority which chooses taxes and public 
spending while an independent central bank makes monetary policy decisions. One key point of the 
model is that it allows exploring the implications of the government’s strategic decision regarding 
the composition of public expenditure. 
The public spending is composed of public sector consumption ( ctg ) and investment (
i
tg ).5 
Public investment consists of productivity enhancing expenditure on, e.g., infrastructure, health and 
education. However, as these favorable consequences are not realized until future periods, this type 
of spending does not form part of the policy maker’s current utility function. On the contrary, 
public consumption is made up of public sector wages, current public spending on goods and other 
government spending that is  assumed to yield immediate utility  to the government.  The fiscal 
authority’s loss function can be represented as follows:
5 We do not specify the demand side of the model with the presence of public consumption  ctg  since the effect of 
public consumption can be neutralised by optimal monetary policy.
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where 0E  is an operator of mathematical expectations, Gβ  the discount factor of the government, 
1δ  and 2δ  the weight assigned to the stabilization of inflation and public spending respectively, 
and the output stabilization is assigned  a weight equal to unity. 
The objectives of the government is to stabilize the inflation around zero, the output and public 
consumption around their respective targets (i.e. tx  and ctg ). The government minimizes the above 
two-period loss function subject to the following budget constraint: 6 
tt
c
t
i
t gg φτpi +=+ , 10 ≤< φ  and 2,1=t . (3)
The above government  budget  constraint  creates  the link between the fiscal  and monetary 
policies, through the term tpi , i.e. the public spending is partially financed by the inflation tax. This 
component  is  neglected  in  the  previous  studies  on  the  interaction  between  fiscal  policy  and 
monetary policy transparency (Hughes Hallett and Viegi, 2003; Ciccarone et al., 2007).  
The  presence  of  tpi  introduces  complex  interactions  between  tax,  public  investment  and 
monetary policy decisions. In effect, current supply-side fiscal policies (distortionary taxes) are 
inflationary  and  hence  increase  the  government’s  seigniorage  revenue  meanwhile  the  public 
investment  in  the  previous  period  has  the  contrary  effect.  On  the  other  hand,  given  public 
expenditures,  fiscal  authorities could reduce tax rate if  the inflation and hence the seigniorage 
revenue are higher. 
6 See  Alesina  and  Tabellini  (1987),  Beestma  and  Bovenberg  (1998)  for  the  derivation  of  this  kind  of  budget 
constraint where the seigniorage revenue comes as source of financing for the government. Huang and Wei (2006) 
derive a budget constraint with the presence of the parameter φ  representing the quality of institutions.
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As in Huang and Wei (2006),  we introduce a connection between the government’s  fiscal 
capacity and the quality of institutions. If the private sector pays a tax in the amount of τ, only φτ  
accrues to the government. The parameter  φ  measuring the no-leakage of tax revenue can be 
thought of as an institution-quality index. If  1=φ , then the quality is the best and there is no 
leakage of tax revenue and the specification becomes that adopted by Alesina and Tabellini (1987). 
The budget constraint (3) is abstracted from public debt and leakage in the collection of inflation 
tax. The introduction of φ  allows extending our results to the case of emerging market economies 
where institutional quality is not high. 
Following Rogoff (1985), we assume that the government, while keeping control of its fiscal 
instruments, delegates the conduct of monetary policy to the central bank with more conservative 
preference than society would itself vote for. Since the central bank is independent, it is unlikely to 
be made responsible for public expenditure deviations ( ggi ~− ). Thus, the central bank is only 
concerned with the inflation rate and output gap. We assume that the central bank sets its policy in 
order to minimize the following loss function:
∑
=
−
−++−=
2
1
22
1
1
00 ]))(1()[(2
1
t
ttt
t
CB
CB xxEL εpiεµβ , 01 >µ , (4)    
where  CBβ  is discount factor of the central bank. The parameter 1µ  is the relative weight that the 
central bank places on the inflation target and it might be different from that of the government. It 
is therefore an index of conservatism (larger 1µ  values) versus liberalism or populism (smaller 1µ  
values). The central bank’s policy instrument is its choice of pi . In practice, the central bank would 
use interest rates. But since the standard theoretical models assume that nominal interest rates have 
no systematic long-run influence on output, we may as well use pi . In the loss function defined in 
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equation (4), it is included an inflationary bias reflected by the presence of output target tx  in the 
objective  function  of  the  central  bank,  destined  to  correct  a  shortfall  in  output  due  to  the 
distortionary effects of taxes or supply-side restrictions for social reasons. This kind of inflationary 
bias is present in the model of Hughes-Hallett and Viegi (2003), but absent in that of Ciccarone et 
al. (2007).
According to the degree of transparency, it could be that the weights assigned by the central 
bank to the inflation and output targets are not perfectly predictable by the government and the 
private sector. In the present model, following Ciccarone et al. (2007), the imperfect disclosure of 
information about the central bank preference is represented by the fact  that  ε  is a stochastic 
variable.7 This specification of central bank’s loss function is adopted for avoiding the arbitrary 
effects of central bank preference uncertainty on average monetary policy (Beetsma and Jensen, 
2003).  In  effect,  a  slight  change  in  the  uncertainty  specification  (e.g.,  the  placement  of  the 
stochastic parameter in front of one or the other argument of the central bank’s objective function) 
can lead to radically different effects on average monetary reactions. 
We assume that the distribution law of ε  is characterized by 0)( =εE , 22 )()var( εσεβ == E  
and  ],1[ 1µε −∈ .  The  variance  2εσ  represents  the  degree  of  opacity  about  the  central  bank 
preference. As the random variable  ε  takes values in a compact set and has an expected value 
equal  to  zero,  2εσ  must  have  a  well  defined  upper  bound;  more  precisely:  ],0[ 1
2 µσε ∈  (see 
7 This formulation is similar to what is proposed by Geraats (2002) for avoiding the arbitrary effects of central bank 
opacity. She assigns a weight ξαα −=  to the output target and ξββ +=  to the inflation target in the central bank’s 
loss function, with 1=+ βα , and α  and β  as their respective perceived average value. This formulation is adopted 
by Hughes-Hallett and Viegi (2003). 
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Ciccarone et al. (2007) for a proof). When 02 =εσ , the central bank is fully predictable and hence 
perfectly transparent (Canzoneri, 1985; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986).8 
3. Equilibrium
The timing of the game is as follows. First,  the government sets tax rate and decides public 
spending for two periods; second, the private sector forms its expectations about inflation; third, the 
central bank decides the monetary policy in choosing inflation rate for two periods. The game is 
solved by backward induction. 
Taking account of the central bank’s loss function (4) and equation (1), the Lagrangian of the 
central bank’s minimization problem is written as: 
∑
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CB ugxxxE ψγτpipiαφεpiεµβ .  (5)
The first-order conditions of the minimization problem of the central bank are: 
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CB , (8)
0))(1( 222
2
=−−+=
∂
Λ∂ φεβ xx
x CB , (9)
8 An alternative way to model non-transparency is to introduce a non-observable output target or control errors (Faust 
and Svensson,  2001, 2002; Jensen, 2002).  But this will have no effect in average as in Hughes-Hallet and Viegi  
(2003) except when we introduce as Walsh (2003) a nonlinear term in the central bank’s loss function associating an 
inflation-targeting weight with the deviation of inflation from its target in a delegation framework. 
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Using the first-order conditions (6)-(9) to eliminate 1φ  and 2φ  leads to the following optimal 
targeting rules:
)()1( 11
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pi , (10) 
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2 xx −
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−=
εµ
εα
pi , (11) 
Using equations (1), (10) and (11), we obtain the following reaction functions of the central 
bank:
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Imposing rational expectations, taking mathematical expectations of equations (12) and (14) 
and using second-order Taylor approximation to estimate the value of ][ )1(
)1(
0 22
1 αεαµ
εα
−−+
+E , we obtain 
the solution of expected inflation rates:
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Using equations (1), (10), (11), (16) and (17), the inflation rates and outputs can be solved as 
function of taxes and public investments as follows: 
)( 1011 xg
i +−Ω= ψγτpi , (18) 
ii gxgx 011011  )( ψγτψγτ +−+−Ψ= , (19)  
)( 2122 xg
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ii gxgx 122122 )( ψγτψγτ +−+−Ψ= , (21)  
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As a Stackelberg leader, the government minimizes its loss function given by equation (2), 
subject to the budget constraint (3), in taking account of the central bank’s reaction functions (12)-
(15) as well as the reaction functions of private sector given by (16) and (17). That is equivalent to 
minimize (2) subject to the constraints given by equations (3) and (18)-(21). 
Taking account of equations (3) and (18)-(21), then the government’s loss function is rewritten 
as follows: 
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The first-order conditions of the government’s minimization problem are:
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Solving the first-orders conditions (23)-(26) yields the reaction functions of the government:
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We notice that an increase in φ , which represents the institutional quality of fiscal authorities, 
has no effect on 1τ , but has positive effect on ig1 , 2τ  and 
ig2 . Higher institutional quality increases 
the resources for public investment in period 1 and more revenue for imposition in period 2. These 
effects allow hence the public  investment to be higher in period 2.  An increase in  γ ,   which 
captures the marginal effect of distortionary taxes, incites the government to decrease the level of 
tax and public investment in two periods. In contrast, an increase in ψ , i.e. the marginal effect of 
past public investment on the productivity of current production, incites the government to increase 
the tax to finance higher investment in period 1, but not necessarily in period 2. In effect,  the 
government can take more taxes given the higher productivity in period 2. But, as the benefits of 
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second period public investment will be for the next government, the current government has no 
incentive in increasing public investment in period 2. 
Proposition 1: When the government optimally decides the public investment and distortionary tax  
rate, it neutralizes the effects of the central bank preference and these of opacity on its decisions. 
Proof: It follows straightforward from equations (27)-(30).  Q.E.D.
We remark that the decisions of the government are independent of the central bank preference. 
The “type” of the central bank (more or less conservative) has neither effect on the fiscal policy and 
public investment nor on their variability. Consequently, the degree of transparency has not any 
impact  on these decisions.  In  contrast,  in  Hughes-Hallet  and Viegi  (2003),  the tax rate is  not 
affected by the lack of transparency on average but shows a higher variability.  Ciccarone  et al. 
(2007) have shown that the equilibrium value of tax (or deficit) depends on the variance of  ε  
(degree of transparency). As uncertainty increases, it has a “moderation” effect on fiscal policies. 
The equilibrium solutions of 1pi , 1x , 2pi  and 2x  are obtained in substituting 1τ , ig1 , 2τ  and 
ig2  
given by equations (27), (28), (29) and (30) into equations (18)-(21) respectively as follows:
01 =pi , (31) 
11 xx = , (32)  
02 =pi , (33) 
22 xx = . (34)  
The above equilibrium solutions show that, in the absence of supply-side shock, the inflation 
and output targets of the central bank are always realized. 
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Proposition 2: When the government optimally decides the public investment and distortionary tax  
rate at the same time, it neutralizes the effects of the central bank preference as well as its opacity  
on the equilibrium solutions, independently of institutional quality.
Proof:  It follows directly from the solutions given by (31)-(34). Q.E.D.
In the absence of shocks affecting the supply side of the economy, the degree of political 
transparency is irrelevant for the economic equilibrium and macroeconomic performance in terms 
of volatility,  in contrast  to the existing studies on the interaction between fiscal  and monetary 
policy. 
It is also interesting to remark that, the decisions of tax and public investment in two periods do 
not depend on the preferences of fiscal authorities. In effect, when the government separately but 
simultaneously  decides  the  levels  of  taxes  and  public  investments,  the  optimal  choices  must 
conceal their respective effects on the production and hence the inflation. To make that possible, 
their respective levels must be independent of the government preferences.
4. Robustness 
The previous results are obtained under a specific sequence of actions in a specific Stackelberg 
game: The government, as a Stackelberg leader, is the first mover. It acts before the private sector 
forms its inflation expectations and the central bank, the Stackelberg follower, decides the level of 
inflation and output. Two tests of robustness are considered in the following. 
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The first robustness test of the previous results is to consider a modified Stackelberg game with 
following  sequence  of  actions:  The  private  sector,  as  the  first  mover,  forms  its  inflation 
expectations and fixes the wage, then the government decides the tax rates and public investments, 
and finally the central bank decides the monetary policy. Solving the game by backward induction 
leads  us  to  firstly  consider  the solution  of  the central  bank’s minimization problem given  the 
decisions of the government and the expected inflation, and then to consider the government’s 
minimization problem given the reaction functions of the central bank, and finally, to determine the 
expected inflation rates and the equilibrium solutions of endogenous variables. 
Solving under this sequence of actions, we obtain exactly the same equilibrium solutions as in 
the Stackelberg equilibrium studied in the previous section, given by equations (27)-(30), and (31)-
(34) (Appendix A). 
The second robustness test is to consider a Nash game between the government and the central 
bank with the following sequence of actions:  The private  sector,  as  the first  mover,  forms its 
inflation  expectations  and  fixes  the  wage;  the  government  and  the  central  bank  plays 
simultaneously, with the government deciding the tax rates and public investments and the central 
bank deciding the monetary policy. Solving the game by backward induction leads us to firstly 
solve the central  bank’s minimization problem given the decisions of  the government  and the 
expected inflation, and the government’s minimization problem given the decisions of the central 
bank, and to finally determine the expected inflation rates and the equilibrium solutions of other 
endogenous variables. 
The Nash equilibrium solutions that we obtain are exactly the same as these at the Stackelberg 
equilibrium studied in the previous section and the one studied in this section, given by equations 
(27)-(30), and (31)-(34) (Appendix B). 
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Proposition 3: The results according to which the degree of transparency does not affect the level  
and volatility of tax, public investment, inflation and output are robust to the modification of the  
game structure between the government, the private sector and the central bank. 
Proof: See Appendix A and B. 
There is a perfect equivalence between the Stackelberg equilibrium where the government is 
the first mover, the Stackelberg equilibrium where the private sector is the first mover and the Nash 
equilibrium.  As  in  the  first  Stackelberg  equilibrium  considered  in  the  section  3,  the  optimal 
decisions of the government about the tax rates and public investments in two periods are not 
influenced by opacity, since the effects of distortionay taxes are compensated by these of public 
investments  thanks  to  the  optimal  decisions  of  the  government.  These  results  imply  that  the 
government could generally neutralize the effects of opacity. There is neither a case against nor a 
case for more opacity. These results are also robust to the variations of institutional quality.
5. Conclusion
In a two-period model with distortionary tax and public investment, we study the interaction 
between fiscal policies and the monetary policy in order to find out if there is a case for monetary 
policy opacity. We find that in the absence of supply shocks affecting the Phillips curve, the fiscal 
bias  due  to  distortionay  tax  is  completely  eliminated  by  the  effects  of  public  investments. 
Independently of institutional quality, the monetary policy opacity has not any effect on the optimal 
decisions  of  the government  at  the Stackelberg  equilibrium where  the government  is  the first 
mover, successively followed by the private sector and the central bank. Furthermore, the level and 
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volatility of tax, public investment, inflation and output are independent of the government and 
central bank preferences.  Robustness tests, by considering the private sector as the first mover but 
keeping the structure of Stackelberg game between the government and the central bank or by 
introducing a Nash game between these two public players, have shown that the previous results 
stay unaffected. 
Appendix  A:  Stackelberg  equilibrium  where  the  private  sector  forms  its  inflation 
expectations before the decision of public sector (Proof of Proposition 3)
The reaction functions of the central bank are not modified by the change introduced in the 
game. They are given by (12)-(15). The government solves the following minimization problem:  
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The first-order conditions of the government’s minimization problem are:
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Solving system (A.1) gives:
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To determine the expected and realized inflation rates, we substitute the solutions of 1τ ,  ig1  
and 2τ  respectively given by equations (A.2)-(A.4) into equations (12) and (13). We obtain:
02121 =pi=pi=pi=pi
ee . (A.6) 
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Using the result given by (A.6) in equations (A.2)-(A.5) leads to the equilibrium solutions for 
1τ ,  ig1  and 2τ  and 
ig2 , which are identical to these given by (27)-(30).
Using  the  results  given  by  equations  (A.6),  (27),  (28)  and  (29)  leads  to  the  following 
equilibrium solutions for 1x , 2x :
11 xx = , (A.7)
22 xx = .  (A.8) 
These solutions are the same as these given in the initial Stackelberg game, so the equilibrium 
is not sensible to opacity. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: The government and the central bank are Nash-players (Proof of Proposition 3)
The central bank, taking the decisions of the government and the inflation expectations as 
given, minimizes its loss function (4) subject to the constraint (1). The Lagrangian of the central 
bank’s minimization problem is identical to (5). The first-order conditions of the central bank’s 
minimization problem are then given by (6)-(9). 
Using the first-order conditions (6)-(9) to eliminate 1φ  and 2φ  leads to the optimal targeting 
rules which are identical to (10)-(11). 
Using equations (3), (10) and (11), we obtain the central bank’s reaction functions as given by 
equations (12)-(15). 
As  a  Nash  player,  the  government  takes  the  decisions  of  the  central  bank  as  given  and 
minimizes:
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These conditions are written, after rearrangements, in matrix form as:
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Solving  (B.5)  for  1τ ,  ig1 ,  2τ  and  
ig2  as function of the expected inflation and exogenous 
variables yields:
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Substituting 1τ  given by (B.6) into equation (12) and imposing rational expectations, we 
obtain:
01 =
epi . (B.10) 
Substituting 2τ  and ig2  respectively given by (B.8) and (B.9) into equation (13) and imposing 
rational expectations, we obtain:
02 =
epi . (B.11)
Then using these results in equations (B.6)-(B.9) leads to the solutions of 1τ , ig1 , 2τ  and 
ig2 , 
which are identical to these given by (27)-(30). 
Substituting then 1τ , ig1  and 2τ  respectively given by equations (27)-(29) into equations (12)-
(15), we obtain:
021 == pipi , 11 xx =   and 22 xx = .
These solutions are the same as these given in previous Stackelberg games. Hence, the level 
and volatility of endogenous variables are not influenced by the degree of opacity. Q.E.D.
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